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Abstract 
Improved governance and lower start-up costs may not be sufficient for encouraging the 
type of entrepreneurship that matters for economic growth. Using panel data on 60 
countries spanning the period 2003-07 this paper establishes that (i) opportunity-
motivated entrepreneurship (as opposed to necessity-motivated entrepreneurship) drives 
economic growth; (ii) governance and the start-up costs are not significant determinants 
of opportunity entrepreneurship; and (iii) better governance leads to higher economic 
growth. This implies that better governance and lower start-up costs, widely advocated 
as measures to promote entrepreneurship in developing countries, may not in fact be 
enough. Indeed, despite poorer governance and higher start-up costs, rates of 
opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship are higher in developing countries. Second, 
better governance can lead to better growth through reducing the impact of destructive 
entrepreneurship (including rent-seeking), even though this may not result in a 
reallocation of effort from destructive towards opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship. 
The paper concludes by discussing whether these results call in question the popular 
belief that a lack of opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship constrains developing 
country growth, and whether there is justification for more proactive government 
support for entrepreneurship. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
Private sector development has become a popular objective of governments, development 
agencies and donors alike (see, e.g., Schulpen and Gibbon 2002). At the heart of private sector 
development strategies is the desire by governments and development institutions to encourage 
and stimulate entrepreneurship (e.g. Minniti 2008a). There is little doubt amongst proponents of 
private sector development that entrepreneurship is the key to economic growth and 
development. Thus it has been claimed that ‘entrepreneurship is the main vehicle of economic 
development’ (Anokhin et al. 2008: 117), ‘…the more entrepreneurs there are in an economy, 
the faster it will grow’ (Dejardin 2000: 2), and that ‘the engine of economic growth is the 
entrepreneur’ (Holcombe 1998: 60).  
 
This enthusiasm for entrepreneurship and the private sector has not always been the case. For 
instance in the currently advanced economies, Audretsch and Thurik (2001, 2004) describe what 
they call the ‘managerial economy’, which has only recently started to give way to the 
‘entrepreneurial economy’. In developing countries, the dominant approach after the Second 
World War was one of state intervention leading to the dominance of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Naudé 2008c). Apart from the emergence of the 
entrepreneurial economy in the advanced economies, the current enthusiasm for entrepreneurship 
in developing countries may be traced to three broad factors, as discussed in Naudé (2008b, 
2008c) which includes the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of Asia, and government and 
governance failures in many developing countries after independence, especially in Africa. Thus 
it was realized that state dominance may come at a cost of corruption, rent-seeking, state capture 
and repression of private initiative. 
 
In the light of these, by the late 1990s entrepreneurship and private sector development was 
popularly seen as the drivers of development. If one accepts this, the question arises how to best 
promote entrepreneurship and private sector development. Although obviously an important 
question, it is not one which has been sufficiently and rigorously scrutinized. Rather, the 
dominant approach towards entrepreneurship which has emerged in recent years has been one 
which I capture with the phrase ‘Out with the sleaze, in with the ease’, meaning rolling back the 
state and limiting opportunities for corruption, rent-seeking and state capture (the ‘sleaze’), and 
reducing the perceived obstacles in the start-up and running of business firms so as to make it 
easier to ‘do business’ (the ‘ease’). Altenburg and von Drachenfels (2006) describes this as the 
’new minimalist approach’ to private sector development. 
 
One can see this ‘minimalist’ approach reflected in the policy advice of especially the World 
Bank, the IMF, and donor agencies. Thus a key requirement of most structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) included provisions for privatization of state enterprises, liberalization of 
markets, improvements in governance (including transparency, accountability) and reduction of 
obstacles to private investment. Notable has been the World Bank’s attempts to measure progress 
in terms of ‘out with the sleaze, in with the ease’. The Bank now makes available for most 
countries in the world, sets of tables of both governance indicators1 and doing business 
                                                 
1  The World Bank currently makes available governance indicators for 212 countries for the period 1996-2007, 
covering six aspects of governance, namely voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 2 
indicators,2 and actively encourages countries to improve their rankings in these tables. The 
explicit underlying assumption is that as countries improve these, they will experience an 
increase in private sector investment and a growth in entrepreneurial activity, both which will 
improve productivity and growth.  
 
In this paper I argue that this approach towards stimulating entrepreneurship and private sector 
development in developing countries may at best be a necessary condition. It may not be 
sufficient. In fact, governance and doing business reforms are reactive measures. Instead, I argue 
that these measures need to be supplemented by more proactive government and institutional 
support for entrepreneurship, in particular for the type of entrepreneurship which will stimulate 
economic growth and development. While regulatory reform which makes it easier to do 
business may increase the number of registered business firms, it may not result in the type of 
entrepreneurship which is most beneficial to growth.  
 
Accordingly, the structure of the argument in this paper is as follows. First, not all forms of 
entrepreneurship are good for economic growth and development; in fact the definitions and 
measures often used in studies to show the beneficial impact of reforms on entrepreneurship may 
be misleading by not taking this into account. Therefore, in Section 2 I discuss the notion of 
entrepreneurship that is of concern to this paper. Thereafter, in Section 3 I provide a snapshot of 
the relevant literature, focusing on the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic 
growth, and on the relationship between start-up barriers, governance and entrepreneurship. In 
Section 4 I state two hypotheses to be tested and describe the methodology to be followed in 
doing so. I use panel data from 60 countries over the period 2003-07 to test these, and attempt to 
overcome the weaknesses that has marked many previous studies into the cross-country 
dynamics of entrepreneurship. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 discuss the 
policy implications of these results, asking whether a lack of opportunity-based entrepreneurship 
do in fact constrain growth in developing countries, and whether there is a case still to be made 
for more proactive government support for entrepreneurship in developing countries. Section 7 
concludes. 
2  Entrepreneurship: notions and policies 
Private sector development depends on entrepreneurship. But not all types of entrepreneurship 
may be beneficial for private sector development and economic growth. And private sector 
development needs more that just entrepreneurship, it also needs managers and risk 
takers/financiers.3 To substantiate these points it is necessary to define entrepreneurship and 
discuss its measurement for purposes of this paper. It should be admitted at the outset that it 
                                                                                                                                                           
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. See 
http://www.govindicators.org.  
2  The World Bank also currently has available indicators of the ease of doing business for over 130 countries for the 
period 2003-07. These contain about 40 ‘Doing Business Indicators’ covering aspects such as the start-up, 
running, and closure of a firm. See http: //www.doingbusiness.org/.  
3  I wish to emphasize that successful private sector development depends on effective and efficient management. 
Therefore, development of managerial skills are important to strengthen the private sector in developing countries. 
Good managers, like good inventors and researchers, are necessary complements to entrepreneurs in the process 
of firm growth. In the remainder of this paper however, my focus will strictly be on the entrepreneur. 3 
might seem at first glance to be a challenging pursuit, given that entrepreneurship is studied 
across many disciplines and that consequently there are many different definitions of 
entrepreneurship4 (see Davidsson 2004: 1).  
 
This may not however, in such a daunting task in the current context where my concern is with 
private sector development which requires first and foremost new venture creation and growth. 
In my view the debate on the definition of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur, in the context 
of new venture creation, has made much progress since the influential work of Schumpeter 
(1911/1934). Accordingly, following Schumpeter there is now substantial agreement that there is 
a subtle difference between entrepreneurship (as process) and the entrepreneur (the agent), and a 
more substantial difference between the entrepreneur and the manager of a firm.5 
Entrepreneurship as process is about the discovery and exploitation of opportunities (Shane and 
Venkataraman 2000). As such entrepreneurship may be found in corporations (e.g. ‘corporate 
entrepreneurship’, ‘intrapreneurship’) and in social, non-profit contexts (e.g. ‘public 
entrepreneurship’, ‘social entrepreneurship’). Individual entrepreneurs can be defined as ‘persons 
who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and 
prestige’ (Baumol 1990: 987). A large part of the entrepreneurship literature is concerned with 
the nature and development of entrepreneurial talent or entrepreneurial ‘capital’ (e.g. Lucas 
1978; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Murphy et al. 1991; Banerjee and Newman 1993; Fonseca 
et al. 2007). 
 
Not all entrepreneurship may be beneficial for economic growth and development. This is 
because entrepreneurial talent may be allocated to activities that may be rewarding for the 
individual, but may have little, or even negative, consequences for broader society. Thus in many 
countries, particularly developing countries, many talented entrepreneurs choose not to become 
entrepreneurs (self-employed) but may take up salaried employment in a state bureaucracy or 
multinational firm, or may emigrate, while at the same time many less talented entrepreneurs are 
pushed into informal and survivalist self-employment. Entrepreneurial talent may also be 
channelled into unproductive (e.g. rent-seeking), or even destructive (e.g. illegal) activities. 
Baumol (1990: 895). As put by Silberman (1956: 42), ‘Throughout history there has been a 
tussle between those who make their way by honest but unimaginative toil and the gamblers, 
pirates, hucksters of patent medicines and the exploitative mediums of newfangled religions’.  
 
It is argued that the institutional environment in a country (broadly defined as the ‘rules of the 
game’) will influence the allocation of entrepreneurial talent (Acs 2008; Amoros 2008; Bowen 
and De Clerq 2008; Minniti 2008a) and that therefore institutional reform is needed to encourage 
the right type of entrepreneurship. The specific institutional reform most often advocated for 
developing countries include strengthening of property rights and control of corruption (Douhan 
                                                 
4  Elsewhere I discuss occupational, behavioural, and outcomes-based definitions of entrepreneurship. See Naudé 
(2008a).  
5  Both Baumol (1968) and Leibenstein (1968) stress the differences between entrepreneurs and managers, and like 
Schumpeter sees innovation as the essential distinguishing characteristic or function of the entrepreneur, as 
opposed to the manager. According to Baumol (1968: 65) ‘The entrepreneur (whether or not he in fact also 
doubles as a manager) has a different function. It is his job to locate new ideas and to put them into effect’. In the 
words of Leibenstein (1968: 72) ‘at one pole there is routine entrepreneurship, which is really a type of 
management, and for the rest of the spectrum we have Schumpeterian or “new type” entrepreneurship’.  4 
and Henrekson, 2009). Empirical support for the latter comes from Bowen and De Clerq (2008) 
who finds evidence that productive entrepreneurship is negatively influenced by the extent of 
corruption in a country. 
 
Although the ‘tussle’ between productive and destructive types of entrepreneurship is strongly 
evident in developing countries (see e.g. Naudé 2007) it is perhaps more apparent that larger 
numbers of people in developing countries are being pushed into informal and survivalist self-
employment; i.e. non-productive entrepreneurship. These people are not entrepreneurs by choice 
and are, in the terminology of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), ‘necessity 
entrepreneurs’. A substantial literature exists on informal entrepreneurship and on small and 
micro firms (see e.g. De Paula and Scheinkman 2007; Ihrig and Moe 2004; Maloney 2004). 
Governments and international development agencies often wish to promote informal 
entrepreneurs/micro firms to grow their firms and ‘graduate’ to become formal, larger firms. 
This is most often attempted through reductions in start-up costs, minimum capital requirements 
and high taxation, and by provision of subsidised formal credit facilities. Most often however, 
these policies do not work (Schramm 2004; Berner et al. 2008; Banerjee and Duflo 2007). 
Banerjee and Duflo (2007: 162) cautions that ‘it is important not to romanticize these penniless 
entrepreneurs’ and Berner et al. (2008: 1) stress that the motivation of informal/necessity 
entrepreneurs are not growth, but survival. Consequently well-intended entrepreneurial policies 
may not only be ineffective, but have negative implications. These policies ‘force entrepreneurs 
to “put their eggs in one basket” and push for graduation, thereby irresponsibly exposing them to 
very high risks. We conclude by calling for a more realistic approach ... survival businesses 
primarily serve as a buffer against slipping deeper into poverty’ (ibid.: 1). 
 
The policy response towards informal/survivalist/necessity entrepreneurs should thus be to 
reduce poverty, which is most effective and sustainable through creation of quality jobs. 
Improvement in formal job opportunities would therefore see the necessity entrepreneurship 
sector shrink, not expand. This conclusion has two implications, one for policy and one for the 
measurement of entrepreneurship. The policy implication is that entrepreneurial support should 
aim to encourage productive, innovative entrepreneurship which could stimulate economic 
growth and job creation, if this is indeed possible. In Section 3 below I explore the findings in 
the literature on the relationship between types of entrepreneurship and economic growth, and in 
Section 5 I present empirical evidence that not all types of ‘entrepreneurship’ have a significant 
impact on economic growth.  
 
The implication for measurement is that the ways in which entrepreneurship is most often 
measured, may not capture the differences between types of entrepreneurship. Most often, 
entrepreneurship is measured statically by the rate of business ownership, or the rate of self-
employment. Clearly, given the previous discussion, this does not take into account the 
motivation of the entrepreneur. This accounts for the fact that a ‘stylized fact’ of the empirical 
entrepreneurship literature is that we observe a negative relationship between self-employment 
rates and GDP per capita (Gollin 2008). In poor countries, with less formal employment 
possibilities, and thus more necessity entrepreneurs, self-employment rates are therefore higher.6 
                                                 
6    According to Gollin (2008: 219) using ILO data on self-employment across countries, ‘Few people in poor 
countries work for wages’.  5 
Judging the effectiveness of entrepreneurial policies or the impact of entrepreneurship on growth 
using self-employment as measurement of entrepreneurship, is therefore likely to be misleading. 
 
To try and overcome the problems of measuring entrepreneurial motivations and thus of 
capturing the impact of different types of entrepreneurship, the GEM make a distinction between 
‘opportunity’ motivated entrepreneurs, and ‘necessity’ motivated entrepreneurs.7 The former can 
be seen as productive entrepreneurs, while the latter may be seen as informal/survivalist 
entrepreneurs. Amoros (2008) also considers the latter as a possible proxy for destructive (rent-
seeking) entrepreneurship, although I will conclude this paper by suggesting that the GEM 
measures (as others) do not directly capture destructive entrepreneurship given that that weak 
governance, rent-seeking and opportunity entrepreneurship often co-exists. Indeed, from the 
empirical results presented in Section 5, I will conclude that destructive and productive 
(opportunity-motivated) entrepreneurship may not be good substitutes, and that reducing 
destructive entrepreneurship does not necessarily mean that more talent will be allocated towards 
productive (opportunity-motivated) entrepreneurship.  
 
In light of the above, I will in the remainder of this paper be concerned with the manifestation of 
entrepreneurship through the start-up rates of new firms—as these are the cornerstone for private 
sector development. I will then make use of the GEM’s data to understand how different types of 
entrepreneurship affect economic growth differently, and whether or not governance and the 
regulatory environment, measured as the incidence of start-up costs, has a significant impact on 
entrepreneurship. 
 
The GEM data is the largest cross-country dataset on start-up rates. GEM has been collecting 
survey data on an increasing number of countries since 1999. Currently 60 countries are 
sampled. The GEM measures ‘total entrepreneurial activity’ (TEA) in a country, which is the 
percentage of the labour force that is either actively involved in starting a new business or who 
own or manage a business that is less than 42 months old. It is therefore a measure of early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity or ‘entrepreneurial propensity’ (Minniti 2008b: 9). An important and 
unique advantage of GEM data for present purposes is that uniform definitions and data 
collection procedures are used across countries (Acs et al. 2008: 267). TEA is broken down in 
the GEM according to the entrepreneur’s motivation. Thus as mentioned it distinguishes between 
opportunity-motivated and necessity-motivated entrepreneurship (or ‘remedial’ 
entrepreneurship). Opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship is the percentage of the labour force 
that is involved in early stage entrepreneurial activity due to the conscious pursuit of an 
opportunity. According to McMullen et al. (2008: 876) opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship 
is ‘consistent with the Schumpeterian innovations thought to contribute significantly to economic 
growth’, and Sanders (2007: 339) argues that opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship is ‘an 
important source of innovation’. In contrast, necessity-motivated entrepreneurship is the 
percentage who have started up their own firms ‘because they cannot find a suitable role in the 
world of work creating a new business is their best available option’ (Reynolds et al. 2005: 217). 
                                                 
7   The GEM also recognizes what it terms ‘high-potential’ entrepreneurial activity (HEA), which measures the 
subjective expectation of the entrepreneur that his or her firm will employ more than 20 employees within five 
years (Wong et al. 2005: 345). Due to the difficulties inherent in using subjective expectations as proxy for 
productive, innovative entrepreneurship, and due to the fact that only about 5 per cent of respondents surveyed in 
GEM considered themselves to be high-potential, I will not use HEA in this paper. 6 
More detailed descriptions of GEM and comparisons with other cross-country datasets are 
contained in Ardagna and Lusardi (2008), Acs et al. (2008), and Reynolds et al. (2005).  
 
In conclusion, if we define entrepreneurship as the recognition and exploitation of opportunities, 
then we should recognize that not all entrepreneurial talent may be allocated in a manner which 
contributes to economic growth. The implication is that policy should encourage the right type of 
entrepreneurship. I had pointed out that the predominant approach is one of strengthening 
institutions (to address the allocation of entrepreneurship away from destructive forms) and of 
reducing barriers to entry/start-up costs so as to encourage the supply of entrepreneurship and 
allow for the graduation of informal/survivalist entrepreneurs. In the next section I provide a 
brief overview of the literature in this regard, after which I set out a model to test for the 
hypotheses which are emerging in this section, namely that the type of entrepreneurship matter 
for growth and that policies for strengthening governance and easing the conditions of doing 
business may encourage the right type of entrepreneurship. 
3 Literature  review 
Two strands of entrepreneurship literature are relevant for the purpose of this paper. The first 
deals with the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth, and suggests that the 
type of entrepreneurship may matter for growth. The second strand deals with the determinants 
of start-up rates, in particular regulatory barriers to entry such as start-up costs, minimum capital 
requirements, and a lack of access to finance. This literature overlaps with the literature on the 
policy measures for promoting entrepreneurship. An exhaustive review of the literature falls 
outside the scope of this paper, however I will highlight some of the key findings and salient 
features thereof that are relevant for current purposes.  
3.1  Entrepreneurship and economic growth 
The theoretical literature has always seen entrepreneurship as essential for economic growth and 
development. Wennekers and Thurik (1999: 30) identify thirteen distinct roles of an entrepreneur 
in economic growth. These include amongst others risk-taking, innovation, arbitrage, and co-
ordination of production factors. In various context and periods different roles have been stressed 
as being more crucial for economic growth than others. Thus for instance in developing 
countries, where countries operate mostly within the technological production frontier, and 
where many markets may be missing, entrepreneurs move firms closer to the frontier through 
technological imitation8 and more efficient allocation of labour and capital (Leibenstein 1968; 
Estrin et al. 2006) and provide competition and markets through arbitrage and a cost-discovery 
function (see e.g. Kirzner 1973; Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). In more advanced economies, they 
push out the technological production function through radical and incremental innovation as 
described by Schumpeter (1911/1934). Nowadays the growth-enhancing role of entrepreneurs in 
advanced economies9 is seen as to transform ‘inventions into commercially viable products and 
                                                 
8  Schmitz (1989) highlights the importance of imitation by entrepreneurs and argues that it may be more important 
for the majority of developing countries than new knowledge generation. 
9  According to Acs (2008: 2) ‘for developed countries high impact entrepreneurship has become the main form of 
entrepreneurship driving their economies’.  7 
processes’ (Minniti 2008a: 779). In all of these the crucial functions provided by the 
entrepreneur always go beyond mere business ownership or managerial functions (‘routine’ 
entrepreneurship), and most often result in the creation of new firms offering new products and 
services.   
 
While the benefits of entrepreneurship has long been the topic of research, more recent has began 
to note that certain types of entrepreneurship may hamper economic growth. Naudé (2008a) 
discuss two ways in which this can occur, namely when entrepreneurial talent is perversely 
allocated towards activities that are personally profitable but socially destructive or 
unproductive, or when there is an increase in the supply of low ability entrepreneurs which 
impose negative externalities on higher-ability entrepreneurs.  
 
As far as empirical tests of the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth is 
concerned, Nyström (2008) provides a summary of the literature. She lists 38 studies between 
1996 and 2006 which quantify the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic 
performance. In these studies entrepreneurship is measured either by self-employment rates 
(most often), business ownership rates (e.g Klapper et al. 2007), early-stage entrepreneurial 
activity (start-up activity) (e.g. Wong et al. 2005) or even by the number of patents registered.10 
Economic performance is measured using either employment, GDP growth, or productivity 
growth. With the exception of three studies, the studies cited by Nyström (2008) are exclusively 
focusing on advanced economies, where governance is strong and doing business seemingly 
easier than in developing countries. This state of affairs has led Autio (2008: 2) to remark that 
‘we actually know very little about whether and how entrepreneurship either contributes or does 
not contribute to economic growth in developing countries’. Nyström (2008) concludes from her 
survey that there is generally, at least over the long run, a positive relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic performance. Her conclusion could however be too optimistic 
and too general. For instance in an earlier survey Parker (2006) reported an ambiguous empirical 
relationship between the rate of self-employment and unemployment rates. Also, as I will show 
next, is that when other definitions of entrepreneurship is used apart from self-employment rates, 
a more nuanced relationship emerges. 
 
Only a few studies have yet utilized the GEM data to explore the macro-level relationship 
between growth and entrepreneurship (and between entrepreneurship and institutional features). 
Of those that do, all are currently plagued by methodological weaknesses. For instance with the 
exception of the study by Autio (2008) none use panel data methods (all use cross-section 
methods), none considers systematically the impact of governance and doing business indicators 
on different motivations (opportunity or necessity) for entrepreneurship, and some do not take 
endogeneity issues (reverse causality) and lags into account.11 As far as the relationship between 
economic growth and entrepreneurship is concerned, one of the first and few studies to use GEM 
data, is that of Wong et al. (2005). As explanatory variable measuring entrepreneurship they used 
the GEM’s measurement of ‘high-potential entrepreneurship’ (HEA), spanning 37 countries for 
                                                 
10 Salgado-Banda (2007) uses patents as a measure for productive entrepreneurship and finds that it has a positive 
impact on economic growth in a sample of 22 OECD countries. 
11 There is likely to be reverse causality between entrepreneurship and economic growth, and entrepreneurship may 
affect growth only after a certain lag (see e.g. Carree and Thurik 2008). 8 
2002 (see footnote 8). They find that only ‘high-potential’ entrepreneurial activity is positively 
associated with economic growth. Autio (2008) uses country-level panel data from the GEM 
spanning the period 2000-07 to regress GDP growth on various measures of entrepreneurship, 
namely TEA, high-potential entrepreneurial activity (HEA), and the ratio between HEA and 
TEA (he does not make a distinction between opportunity-and necessity motivated 
entrepreneurship). As controls he includes GDP per capita and population growth as well as two 
indicators from the World Bank’s governance indicators (he chooses the quality of regulatory 
control as well as the corruptions index). He finds that ‘HEA exhibits a positive and statistically 
significant association with GDP growth with a one-year time lag’ (ibid.:14). As in other studies, 
he also finds that the level of the corruption index has a negative impact on subsequent GDP 
growth. 
 
Finally, in developing countries, small businesses predominate, and are often seen to reflect 
entrepreneurship. However, Nyström’s (2008) survey did not include studies which used small 
firms as a measure of entrepreneurship.12 A survey of those would have found that the evidence 
that small businesses per se is good for growth, particularly in developing countries, is lacking. 
For instance Beck et al. (2003) using cross-country data find no evidence that small business 
firm growth is associated with higher growth levels.  
3.2  Start-up costs and regulations as barrier to entrepreneurship 
Start-up costs and regulations refer to the effort required to begin a firm. It differs in duration and 
content from country to country, but generally include aspects such as the cost, number of 
procedures and time it takes to obtain a permit to operate a business, the costs of setting up a 
business, which often includes a fixed cost/sunk cost element, and the regulations that needs to 
be adhered to in terms of labour and production and organisation standards (Fonseca et al. 2001). 
The World Bank, in its Doing Business Indicators, measures start-up costs and regulations 
through four indicators: the number of procedures to be followed, the length of time it takes, the 
cost of start-up as a percentage of per capita income, and the minimum capital required to start a 
business, also as a percentage of per capita income. There are a number of good reasons why 
start-up costs and regulations may be needed, and may even be beneficial for entrepreneurship. 
Three reasons stand out. First, regulations are needed to protect the public and workers from 
potential fraud and exploitation by unscrupulous agents (Fonseca et al. 2007). Second, costs and 
regulations act as a mechanism to ‘weed out’ low quality entrepreneurs (Klapper et al. 2006). It 
has been found that higher ability entrepreneurs more easily overcome such regulatory barriers, 
which results in the pool of entrepreneurs being of higher average quality (Parker 2006). Third, 
start-up costs and regulations is very often a method to improve government revenue, especially 
where firms find it easier to avoid normal taxation (Klapper et al. 2006).  
 
Despite these justifications for start-up costs and regulations for new firms, concerns about these 
have arisen due to accumulating evidence that start-up costs may be misused, and that this may 
                                                 
12 Although small firms are sometimes used as a measure of entrepreneurship, they are not necessarily synonymous 
with entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial ventures (Wennekers and Thurik 1999: 29). Most small firms are run by 
managerial business owners rather than entrepreneurs (Carree et al. 2002: 271).  9 
explain the wide variety in start-up rates and regulations across the world.13 The main problems 
associated with start-up costs and regulations are corruption and rent-seeking, protection of 
incumbent firms, and disincentives for firms to register. Thus for instance Djankov et al. (2002) 
found evidence that higher start-up costs and more regulation are associated with higher levels of 
corruption and a larger informal sector.14 In their words ‘regulation is pursued for the benefits of 
politicians and bureaucrats’. Where such corruption is tolerated, or not effectively controlled, 
start-up costs may not significantly keep out entrepreneurs or act as filter for good 
entrepreneurial talent (Klapper et al. 2006: 622). Start-up costs may also rise as a reflection of 
incumbent entrepreneurs’ influence. Parker (2006: 707) speculates that incumbent entrepreneurs 
may drive an increase in the regulation of business start-up that has been observed in many 
countries, as a way of creating barriers to entry for new firms. Thus start-up costs and regulations 
may be necessary, but may be misused and may exceed sensible levels. The question is how will 
this affect entrepreneurial start-ups, particularly of the type of entrepreneurs that are more likely 
to drive economic growth?  
 
Empirical evidence on the effect of start-up costs and regulations on entrepreneurship tend to be 
mixed.15 Data using self-employment as measure of entrepreneurship often finds a negative 
relationship and data using start-up rates (TEA) often finds no statistically significant 
relationship. For example, Klapper et al. (2006) using cross-section data from a sample of EU 
countries and measuring ‘entrepreneurship’ as the number of new firms formally incorporated—
finds that entry costs and regulations result in less new firm incorporations, tend to keep out 
smaller firms, and contribute to lower productivity from incumbent firms through lowering rates 
of competition from new firms. Likewise Fonseca et al. (2001) using self-employment data finds 
evidence from OECD countries that start-up costs hinder entrepreneurial entry and result in 
lower employment.  
 
In contrast, Van Stel et al. (2007) using GEM data on entrepreneurial start-up rates from 39 that 
capital costs and labour regulations matter for start-ups, but that start-up costs are not significant. 
Ho and Wong (2007) also using GEM data, but only a cross-section of 37 countries for 2002, 
estimate the impact of financial constraints and entry regulations on entrepreneurship. They use 
as measure of entrepreneurship alternatively TEA, HEA, opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship 
and necessity-motivated entrepreneurship. As controls they use GDP per capita and productivity 
growth. To measure start-up regulations they compile a composite business cost index from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators, and find that this only has a negative impact on 
                                                 
13 Theoretical models have also been provided to show that start-up costs can lower the relative number of 
individuals who choose to self-employment as an occupational choice (e.g. Fonseca et al. 2001) and that start-up 
costs reduce the positive effect of wealth holdings on the decision of individuals to enter self-employment 
(Fonseca et al. 2007).  
14 If this also holds in the present sample, then we should expect in Section 5 to find a positive relationship between 
necessity entrepreneurship and start-up costs across countries—which we do not however find in the present 
sample. 
15 In the review here, I focus on studies concerned with the relationship between start-up or entry regulations and 
costs and entrepreneurship. I do not review studies which investigates other constraints such those posed by e.g. 
taxes (see Gentry and Hubbard, 2000), finance (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Ho and Wong 2007), and 
closure procedures (e.g. Acs et al. 2008). 10 
opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship, and not on necessity-motivated or high-potential 
entrepreneurial activity (HEA). 
 
Other recent studies that use GEM data to study the determinants of entrepreneurship on the 
country level include Acs et al. (2008), Bowen and De Clerq (2008) and McMullen et al. (2008). 
Acs et al. (2008) use pooled, cross-sectional data across 40 countries to investigate the impact of 
regulatory barriers (taken from the Doing Business Indicators) and operational risk on the spread 
between formal and informal entrepreneurship. They compare in this regard the GEM data on 
start-up rates (TEA) with the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) data on 
formal firm registrations, and make the assumption that the former measures ‘entrepreneurship 
potential’ and the latter ‘actual entrepreneurship’, so that the difference is ‘lost entrepreneurship’. 
In their regression analysis they control for GDP per capita (although they do not use lags, thus 
not taking into account endogeneity problems) as well as for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector as a measure of financial development. They find that start-up costs significantly 
determines the amount of ‘lost entrepreneurship’, that is the spread between the formal and 
informal sectors, and that start-up barriers appear to be more significant for formal entrepreneurs 
and less so for early stage entrepreneurship. 
 
Bowen and De Clerq (2008) use GEM data on 40 countries over the period 2002-04 to determine 
that the proportion of a country’s high-growth entrepreneurs is a positive function of finance and 
education, and a negative function of corruption. They do not specifically test for start-up costs. 
Apart from corruption, they have no other governance-related variables, although they include 
proxies for regulatory protection and regulatory complexity. They find that these measures are 
insignificant, however. McMullen et al. (2008) used GEM data for 2002 on 37 countries to study 
the determinants of opportunity-motivated and necessity-motivated entrepreneurship. As 
independent variables they included ten measures of economic freedom, and controlled for GDP 
per capita. They establish that opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship is higher in countries with 
more economic freedom, which can be taken to suggest indirectly that reforms to improve 
governance (such as to broaden voice and accountability) and lower restrictions on doing 
business would stimulate opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship.  
 
A shortcoming of the macro-level studies quoted above is that their methodologies contain a critical 
number of weaknesses. For instance in most case the authors restrict their estimators to OLS in 
conjunction with using cross-section data. In such cases OLS estimators are often biased due to non-
constant variances of the error terms; also, cross-section methods cannot control for unobserved 
heterogeneity amongst countries and is therefore subjected further to omitted variable bias. In 
addition they bias their estimates by including GDP per capita as control variable on the right hand 
side of their estimating equations together with their independent variables (measures of economic 
freedom and operational risk), thus not taking into consideration the high level of correlation between 
these variables.  
 
In contrast to the previous studies quoted, and the approach in this paper, Ardagna and 
Lusardi (2008) used GEM data on the micro-level (they used individual data on more than 
150,000 individuals surveyed across 37 countries in 2001 and 2002) to determine how a 
country’s regulatory environment influences an individual’s occupational decision to become 
an opportunity-motivated entrepreneur. As they use micro-level data they do not have the rate 11 
of opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship as dependent variable. They define a dummy variable 
to be equal to one if an individual has indicated that he or she started the firm to exploit an 
opportunity, and equal to zero otherwise. They find that entry regulations (start-up costs, the time 
it takes and the number of procedures needed) reduce the positive effects that social networks 
and education has on the probability of someone becoming an opportunity entrepreneur. They 
also find that entry regulations makes it less likely for unemployed persons and young people to 
enter into entrepreneurship.  
 
While Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) finds that start-up costs and regulations can limit the benefits 
of social networks and education on entrepreneurship, Fonseca et al. (2007) using data from nine 
EU countries find that start-up costs reduce the size of the positive effect which individual 
wealth (finance) has on the probability that an individual will choose to become self-employed. 
The relationship between start-up costs and education is further explored by Dulleck et al. 
(2006). They provide a theoretical model which departs from the assumption that higher 
education of the entrepreneur is a requirement for high-growth firms to be successful. Then, a 
reduction in start-up costs lead to more people pursuing higher education, which in turn has 
positive spillover effects as it approves the available skills in the labour market overall. Using 
cross-country data they find evidence of a negative relationship between start-up costs and 
higher education enrollment rates. 
 
Thus to conclude, there are a growing number of studies which investigates the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and start-up costs, although as far as I can determine there has not yet 
been a study concerned with the direct impact of governance indicators on opportunity and 
necessity motivated entrepreneurship. The studies on the relationship between start-up costs and 
entrepreneurship tend to find mixed results, depending also on the definition of entrepreneurship 
used. Furthermore, generalization of the results is complicated due to methodological 
weaknesses in these studies. In the remainder of this paper I will therefore empirically 
investigate the impact of opportunity and necessity motivated entrepreneurship on economic 
growth, as well as the extent to which governance and start-up costs matter for entrepreneurship. 
As explained in the next section, I will attempt to do so using panel data methods to overcome 
the methodological weaknesses in earlier studies. 
4 Methodology   
4.1 Hypotheses  and  model 
From the previous sections, the following two hypotheses are formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The type of entrepreneurship matter for economic growth. In particular, 
economic growth is more likely to be driven by opportunity than necessity 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The determinants of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship are 
different. In particular, governance and doing business indicators are unlikely to have a 
significant direct impact on opportunity entrepreneurship.   
 
Hypothesis 1 will be tested by estimating the following growth model:  12 
it i it it it u c x e z + + + = β α  (1) 
 
For i = 1,….N (N=60) and t = 2,….T (T=5) and where zit is the economic growth rate in country 
i at time I, eit is alternatively opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship (as defined by the GEM, 
see Section 2), xit is a 1×K vector of control variables as listed in Table 1. As indicated in the 
table some of these vary over time. Also in (1) ci is unobserved country characteristics that are 
constant over the time period, and influence zit; and uit is a random error term with the usual 
properties. 
 
Second, hypothesis 2 will be tested by estimating the determinants of respectively opportunity 
and necessity entrepreneurship as follows:  
it i it it it it d y g b e ε θ γ δ + + + + =  (2) 
 
Where eit is alternatively opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship; bit an indicator of the ease 
of doing business in country i in period t; git an indicator of governance in country i in period t 
and  yit a 1×M vector of control variables (see Table 1). As in (1) di is unobserved country 
characteristics that are constant over the time period, and influence eit; and εit is a random error 
term. 
4.2 Estimator 
Equations (1) and (2) will be estimated using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as well as a 
random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, given that panel data for 60 
countries for the period 2003-07 is available. I use the random effects GLS estimator in order to 
exploit the properties of the panel dataset. This is useful in the present case since OLS estimates 
may be subject to omitted variable bias. Thus there might be omitted factors which differs across 
time or across countries and which may influence GDP growth and entrepreneurial start-up rates. 
The random effects estimator is relevant to control for omitted variables which may differ both 
across time and across countries. In contrast, a fixed effects estimator control for omitted 
variables which differ across countries but are constant over time. As entrepreneurial rates differ 
marked across time, it is intuitively more attractive to use a random effects estimator. The 
random effects estimator is also a more efficient estimator. I used the Hausman test to determine 
whether the choice to use a random effects estimator is statistically acceptable in the present 
case. For both equations (1) and (2) this test confirmed that using a random effects estimator is 
appropriate.  
Table 1: Variables and data sources 
Variable Description  Source 
Opp  Opportunity entrepreneurship. The percentage of adults in early stage entrepreneurial 
activity who are motivated to exploit a business opportunity. 
Covers approximately 60 countries over the period 2003-07 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
Nec  Necessity entrepreneurship. The percentage of adults in early stage entrepreneurial activity 
who are motivated to start a business due to a lack of employment opportunities. Covers 
approximately 60 countries over the period 2003-07 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
Startcost  The costs of starting up a business firm, measured as a percentage of per capita income. 
Covers 60 countries over the period 2003-07. 
World Bank. Doing Business 
Indicators 
GDPPC  GDP per capita in constant values. Adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). Covers 60 
countries over the period 2003-07. 
World Bank. World Development 
Indicators Online 
Growth  Percentage growth in real GDP per annum. Covers 60 countries over the period 2003-07.  World Bank. World Development 
Indicators Online 
Credit   Amount of credit extended to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. Covers 60 
countries over the period 2003-07. 
World Bank. World Development 
Indicators Online 
Patents  The number of patent applications filed by residents of a country. Covers 60 countries over 
the period 2003-07. 
World Bank. World Development 
Indicators Online 
Voice  Voice and accountability indicator. The indicator ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher 
scores signify better outcomes. 
World Bank. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Political  Political stability indicator. The indicator ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores signify 
better outcomes. Data for 60 countries for the period 2003-07 is used. 
World Bank. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Gov  Government effectiveness indicator. The indicator ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher 
scores signify better outcomes. Data for 60 countries for the period 2003-07 is used. 
World Bank. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Reg  Regulatory quality indicator. The indicator ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores 
signify better outcomes. Data for 60 countries for the period 2003-07 is used. 
World Bank. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Law  Rule of law indicator. The indicator ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores signify 
better outcomes. Data for 60 countries for the period 2003-07 is used. 
World Bank. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Corrupt  Control of corruption indicator. The indicator ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores 
signify better outcomes. Data for 60 countries for the period 2003-07 is used.- 
World Bank. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Capital  Gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP per annum. Covers 60 countries over 
the period 2003-07. 
World Bank. World Development 
Indicators Online 
Pop  Annual population growth. Covers 60 countries over the period 2003-07.  World Bank. World Development 
Indicators Online 
Source: See text. 
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4.3 Variables  and  data 
The variables and data sources are listed and described in Table 1. As indicated, the data covers 
60 countries16 over the period 2003-07. A word about the choice of control variables is in order. 
For equation (1), x includes initial GDP per capita, population growth, and gross fixed capital 
formation. This choice has been informed by economic growth theory, which sees countries with 
higher GDP per capita growing slower (‘convergence’), and which sees greater inputs of labour 
(proxied by population growth) and capital as crucial drivers of growth. In case of equation (2) 
the control variables17 includes GDP per capita to control for level of development (there is 
robust evidence that start-up rates vary across countries depending GDP per capita), patents (as 
indicator of the creation of new opportunities/innovativeness in an economy), GDP growth (to 
test whether or not growth creates opportunities) and the amount of credit extended to the private 
sector (which proxies financial sector development/financial access as for instance in Acs et al. 
2008). 
 
Having described the methodology which I use in this paper, I can now point out that the paper 
makes a contribution in terms of improving on the methodologies which have previously been 
used in this literature on the macro-level determinants of entrepreneurship. Thus, previous papers 
such as those by Wong et al. (2005), Bowen and De Clerq (2008) and Acs et al. (2008) which 
studied the relationship between GEM measures of entrepreneurship and various macro-level 
determinants, do not make use of panel data methods, thereby rendering their results subject to 
omitted variable bias. Also, I use a larger sample of periods and of countries than in previous 
studies and include a fair number of developing countries in the sample as well. I also use a 
richer set of explanatory variables to measure governance and to use as controls. 
5 Empirical  results 
5.1 Descriptive  overview 
Table 2 summarizes the data. Mean values is shown for the entire sample, as well as separately 
for advanced and developing economies. For ease of reference start-up costs and governance 
indicators has been highlighted. This shows substantial differences between advanced and 
developing countries. While the sample mean for start-up costs is 16.9 per cent of per capita 
income, it is 9.63 per cent in the sub-sample of advanced economies, but three times higher on 
average in developing countries, at 29.4 per cent. Also, comparing the governance indicators, it 
can be seen that whereas these are all positive in advanced economies, they are all negative in 
developing countries. Indeed, the correlation coefficients between per capita GDP and the 
                                                 
16 The countries and territories included are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
17 I will indicate below that were appropriate I have used lagged values of GDP per capita and GDP growth in the 
regressions so as to avoid endogeneity (reverse causality) problems.  15 
governance indicators are high, ranging between 0.70 in the case of voice and accountability to 
0.87 in the case of rule of law. Table 2 also show however, that despite average start-up costs 
being three times higher on average in developing countries than in advanced economies, 
opportunity entrepreneurship rates are twice as high on average. Furthermore, GDP growth is on 
average also almost twice as high in the sample of developing economies than in the sample of 
advanced economies.  
Table 2: Summary of data 
Variable No.  of 
observations 
Mean for all 
countries 
Mean for 
advanced 
economies 
Mean for 
developing 
economies 
Opp 184  6.49  %  5.03%  10.28% 
Nec 187  2.52  %  1.30%  5.78% 
Startcost  298  16.9 %  9.63%  29.4% 
GDPPC 288  $20,002  $27,457  $7,008 
Growth 288  4.81  %  3.94%  6.32% 
Credit   281  57.9 %  105%  49.34% 
Patents 157  21,898  25,307  10,020 
Voice  300  0.628  1.018  -0.044 
Political  300  0.263  0.678  -0.453 
Gov  300  0.820  1.297  -0.004 
Reg  300  0.741  1.181  -0.018 
Law  300  0.609  1.132  -0.297 
Corrupt  300  0.695  1.238  -0.244 
Capital 256  22.09  %  21.95%  22.29% 
Pop 295  0.89%  0.71%  1.18% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank and GEM data. 
 
The data in Table 2 therefore suggests that there might be a positive relationship between 
opportunity entrepreneurship and economic growth (both of these are almost twice as high in 
developing than advanced economies), and that there does not seem to be a negative relationship 
between start-up costs and entrepreneurship (start-up costs are on average three times higher in 
the sample of developing economies, where opportunity entrepreneurship is higher, than in 
advanced economies). 
 
To further investigate these features, Figures 1-6 contain scatter plots of the relationship between 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship on the one hand, and economic growth, doing 
business indicators, and governance indicators on the other. Figure 1 suggests that there may be a 
positive relationship between opportunity entrepreneurship and GDP growth, although the 
positive pattern seems weaker for countries with opportunity entrepreneurship rates in excess of 
10 per cent. In contrast, Figure 2 does not seem to suggest any strong relationship between GDP 
growth and necessity entrepreneurship. 16 
Figure 1: Opportunity entrepreneurship and economic growth 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank and GEM data. 
 
Figure 2: Necessity entrepreneurship and economic growth 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank and GEM data. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between opportunity entrepreneurship and start-up costs, 
whereas Figure 4 depicts between necessity entrepreneurship and start-up costs. The figures 
suggest no strong relationships. 
 
 17 
Figure 3: Opportunity entrepreneurship and start-up costs 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank and GEM data. 
 
Figure 4: Necessity entrepreneurship and start-up costs 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank and GEM data. 
 
Finally, there is the relationship between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship and the six 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. Due to space limitations these are not all shown here. Here I 
only include the relationship between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship and political 
stability, as it is one of the few cases where some relationship may be inferred from the graph. 
As Figure 5 seems to suggest, there might be a negative relationship between political stability 18 
and necessity entrepreneurship. Thus, political instability may be an important factor which 
pushes people into self-employment for survival reasons. 
 
Figure 5: Relationship between opportunity entrepreneurship and political stability 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank and GEM data. 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between necessity entrepreneurship and political stability 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank and GEM data. 
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5.2 Regression  results 
Table 2 and Figures 1-6 offer tentative support for the hypotheses put forward in Section 4.1. 
Thus, there is some indication that only opportunity entrepreneurship may matter for growth 
(Figures 1 and 2), and that governance and doing business indicators (start-up costs) are not 
strongly related to opportunity entrepreneurship (Table 2; Figures 3-6). In this section I provide 
evidence on the statistical significance of these relationships using OLS and random effects GLS 
estimates. 
Entrepreneurship and growth 
Equation (1) was estimated using both OLS and random effects GLS, using as measure of 
entrepreneurship (e) alternatively opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship as measured by the 
GEM. Because the OLS and random effects GLS results are very similar,18 I only report here the 
random effects GLS results in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Three remarks regarding the treatment of the right-hand side variables are in order. First, it will 
be seen than opportunity entrepreneurship enters as a lagged variable in (1). This is to avoid 
possible endogeneity problems, given that economic growth could be a determinant of 
opportunity entrepreneurship. Second, the governance indicators enters in first differences 
(indicated by ‘d’). This is due to the fact that the governance indicators in levels are significantly 
correlated with initial GDP capita. However, there is little correlation between changes in 
governance indicators and initial GDP per capita. The coefficients on the governance indicators 
would therefore capture the effects of improvements or deteriorations in the quality of 
governance on economic growth. Third, the governance indicators, being themselves highly 
correlated with one another, is entered sequentially, the results contained in columns 2-7.  
 
In Table 3 can be seen that opportunity entrepreneurship is a significant determinant of economic 
growth, even when one controls for initial GDP per capita, population growth, and fixed capital. 
It also remains significant when various governance indicators are included. It can also be seen 
from the table that, with the exception of voice and accountability, all of the other governance 
indicators have a positive and significant impact on real GDP growth. Although opportunity 
entrepreneurship is significant, Table 3 suggests that the impact of governance indicators tend to 
be larger—the largest single impact on growth seems to come from improvements in the rule of 
law and the control of corruption. The results in Table 4 differ from that in Table 3, in that 
necessity entrepreneurship does not consistently appear as a significant determinant of real GDP 
growth. It is generally insignificant, with the only exceptions where government effectiveness 
and the rule of law enter into the equation. As in Table 3, all of the governance indicators, with 
the exception of voice and accountability, has a positive and significant impact on real GDP 
growth. As for the control variables, initial GDP per capita enters significantly and with the right 
sign (negative) suggesting (slow) convergence. Capital also enters positively and significantly as 
was expected. Population growth turns out to be insignificant (although it is significant in the 
OLS results). 
 
I can thus conclude that the results confirm Hypothesis 1. 
                                                 
18 The full OLS results are available on request.  
Table 3: Random effects regression results for the impact of opportunity entrepreneurship on growth in GDP 
Variable (1) 
Without 
governance 
(2) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
(3) 
Political 
Stability 
(4) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(5) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
(6) 
Rule of Law 
(7) 
Control of 
Corruption 
Constant  4.6 (2.18)**  4.6 (2.2)**  4.4 (2.18)**  4.6 (2.09)**  4.50 (2.22)**  4.89 (2.14)**  5.07 (2.07)** 
Opp (lagged)  0.14 (0.06)**  0.14 (0.06)**  0.14 (0.06)**  0.16 (0.06)**  0.17 (0.06)**  0.15 (0.06)**  0.13 (0.06)** 
d.Voice   0.14  (0.92)           
d.Political     2.41  (1.18)**         
d.Gov       3.09  (1.00)**      
d.Reg         3.78  (1.08)***     
d.Law           7.6  (2.08)***   
d.Corrupt            4.32  (1.23)*** 
Initial GDP  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)*** 
Pop  -0.09 (0.44)  -0.08 (0.43)  -0.06 (0.45)  -0.15 (0.42)  -0.20 (0.44)  -0.10 (0.42)  -0.16 (0.42) 
Capital  0.05 (0.09)  0.05 (0.09)  0.05 (0.09)  0.04 (0.08)  0.05 (0.09)  0.04 (0.09)  0.04 (0.08) 
R
2  0.26 0.26  0.29 0.30 0.27  0.32   
Source: See text. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively indicated by ***, ** and *. Number of observations = 114, 
groups = 51. 
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Table 4: Random effects regression results for the impact of necessity entrepreneurship on growth in GDP 
Variable (1) 
Without 
governance 
(2) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
(3) 
Political 
Stability 
(4) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(5) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
(6) 
Rule of Law 
(7) 
Control of 
Corruption 
Constant  4.31 (1.91)**  4.30 (1.91)**  4.27 (1.91)**  4.16 (1.83)**  4.34 (1.94)  4.19 (1.84)**  4.71 (1.84)** 
Nec (lagged)  0.22 (0.15)  0.22 (0.15)  0.22 (0.14)  0.25 (0.15)*  0.24 (0.14)  0.29 (0.15)**  0.23 (0.144) 
d.Voice   0.11  (0.91)           
d.Political     2.13  (1.13)*         
d.Gov       2.9  (0.97)**     
d.Reg         3.45  (1.12)**     
d.Law           8.15  (2.30)***  
d.Corrupt            4.41  (1.25)*** 
Initial GDP  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)** 
Pop  -0.05 (0.42)  -0.04 (0.41)  -0.00 (0.42)  -0.09 (0.39)  -0.12 (0.41)  -0.08 (0.41)  -0.14 (0.41) 
Capital  0.07 (0.08)  0.07 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.07 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.05 (0.08) 
R
2   overall 0.27 0.26  0.31 0.31 0.27  0.34  0.30 
Source: See text. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively indicated by ***, ** and *. Number of observations = 115, 
groups = 51 
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Start-up costs, governance, and entrepreneurship 
The relationship between entrepreneurship and start-up costs (ease of doing business) and 
governance indicators was estimated as per equation (2) using OLS and random effects GLS. As 
the OLS results are broadly similar, I only report here the random effects panel data estimations, 
and do so in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 contains the results of the impact of start-up costs and 
governance indicators on opportunity entrepreneurship, and Table 6 contains the results of their 
impact on necessity entrepreneurship. As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, GDP 
growth is entered with a lag (so as to avoid endogeneity problems) and because of 
multicollinearity the various indicators of good governance enter sequentially.  
 
The results in Tables 5 and 6 are very similar, in that neither start-up costs nor governance have 
any statistically significant impact on either opportunity or necessity entrepreneurship. Amongst 
the control variables, GDP per capita is significantly (and negatively) related to both opportunity 
and necessity entrepreneurship—this confirms that with higher levels of development the 
opportunity costs (which includes wage employment but also social benefits) of entrepreneurship 
becomes larger. Thus countries with higher per capita GDP will be more likely to have lower 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. GDP growth lagged has no statistically significant 
impact on entrepreneurship. However, in the case of opportunity entrepreneurship, credit 
extended to the private sector does turn out to be statistically significant. This finding is 
consistent with that of Bowen and De Clerq (2008) which finds financial access to be a 
significant determinant of high-growth entrepreneurship in the GEM data. Lack of access to 
finance/underdeveloped financial sector may therefore limit opportunity entrepreneurship.  
 
Although much more need to be done to identify the determinants of opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurship, the results here confirm Hypothesis 2. 
  
Table 5: Random effects regression results for the impact of start-up costs and governance on opportunity entrepreneurship 
Variable (1) 
Without 
governance 
(2) 
Voice and 
accountability 
(3) 
Political 
stability 
(4) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(5) 
Regulatory 
quality 
(6) 
Rule of law 
(7) 
Control of 
corruption 
Constant  8.5 (1.95)***  8.36 (1.98)***  8.41 (2.00)***  8.52 (1.94)***  8.7 (1.97)***  8.37 (1.83)***  8.36 (1.94)*** 
Start-up costs  -0.02 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.09)  -0.04 (0.09)  -0.02 (0.09)  -0.03 (0.09)  -0.01 (0.09)  -0.01 (0.09) 
d.Voice   0.43  (0.94)           
d.Political     -1.95  (1.32)         
d.Gov       0.20  (1.44)     
d.Reg         -1.79  (1.55)     
d.Law           3.89  (3.69)   
d.Corrupt            0.93  (2.58) 
GDP per 
capita 
-0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)**  -0.00 (0.00)***  -0.00 (0.00)** 
Patents  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00) 
Credit  0.02 (0.01)**  0.02 (0.007)**  0.02 (0.007)**  0.02 (0.00**)  0.02 (0.007)**  0.02 (0.01)*  0.02 (0.01)* 
Growth (lag)  0.22 (0.15)  0.22 (0.16)  0.22 (0.15)  0.22 (0.16)  0.20 (0.15)  0.27 (0.18)  0.23 (0.17) 
R
2  0.12 0.13  0.10 0.13 0.11  0.15  0.13 
Source: See text. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively indicated by ***, ** and *. Number of observations = 75, 
groups = 36. 
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Table 6: Random effects regression results for the impact of start-up costs and governance on necessity entrepreneurship 
Variable (1) 
Without 
governance 
(2) 
Voice and 
accountability 
(3) 
Political 
stability 
(4) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(5) 
Regulatory 
quality 
(6) 
Rule of law 
(7) 
Control of 
corruption 
Constant  4.69 (0.93)***  5.05 (0.95)***  4.78 (0.94)***  4.70 (0.93)***  4.72 (0.96)***  4.73 (0.94)***  4.78 (0.93)*** 
Start-up costs  0.05 (0.07)  0.04 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  0.04 (0.06) 
d.Voice    -1.21  (0.62)         
d.Political      1.07  (0.72)       
d.Gov       -0.06  (0.53)     
d.Reg         -0.13  (0.97)    
d.Law           -0.99  (1.72)   
d.Corrupt            -0.77  (1.15) 
GDP per capita  -0.00 (0.00)***  -0.00 (0.00)***  -0.00 (0.00)***  -0.00 (0.00)***  -0.00 (0.00)***  -0.00 (0.00)***  -0.00 (00)*** 
Patents  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00) 
Credit  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.01 (0.04)  0.01 (0.04) 
Growth (lag)  -0.03 (0.07)  -0.06 (0.08)  -0.04 (0.07)  -0.03 (0.07)  -0.03 (0.07)  -0.04 (0.08)  -0.04 (0.08) 
R
2  0.45  0.45 0.47  0.45  0.45 0.44 0.44 
Source: See text. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 1 %, 5% and 10% levels respectively indicated by ***, ** and *. Number of observations = 76, 
groups = 36. 
 
2
425 
6 Discussion 
The results presented in the previous section have two implications. The first 
implication is that simply improving governance, or reducing start-up costs may not be 
sufficient to raise opportunity entrepreneurship. The second, more contentious, 
implication is that the supply of productive entrepreneurship may not be a problem or 
shortcoming in developing countries, or for development in general. Let me briefly 
elaborate on these. 
 
Despite weak governance and high start-up costs opportunity entrepreneurship is 
already high in developing countries. Although many ascribe this to the low opportunity 
cost of entrepreneurship in developing countries, it is also consistent with the notion that 
‘the demand for entrepreneurship in economic development would be particularly high’ 
(Leff 1979: 49). As put by Ho and Wong (2007: 198) ‘there are more entrepreneurial 
opportunities in developing countries’. Arguments that a lack of the right type of 
entrepreneurship may be lacking in developing countries may therefore be exaggerated, 
as the evidence in this paper has found that the higher number of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and demand for entrepreneurship in developing countries is indeed 
matched by higher rates of opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs entering the market. 
 
The view that lack of entrepreneurship is a binding constraint on growth in developing 
countries is in fact a view that has waxed and waned over the past five decades. 
Immediately after many developing countries gained independence in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, many saw the demand for entrepreneurship as substantial and 
the supply inadequate. However, by the late 1970s already, concerns about the lack of 
entrepreneurship started to recede. Entrepreneurship all but disappeared from 
development economics texts in the 1980s and 1990s, based on a general view, as 
voiced by Leff (1979: 51) that ‘entrepreneurship is no longer a problem’ or a ‘relevant 
constraint on the pace of development’. Leff (1979) did however qualify this opinion in 
two ways, which I consider to be still highly relevant for developing countries and for 
the debate of the role which government policy can play in encouraging the right type of 
entrepreneurship. First, he remarked that if indeed entrepreneurship had ever been 
lacking in developing countries in the past, it had during the intervening years been so 
successful that this very success created further problems for developing countries. 
These new problems include the rise of ‘oligopoly capitalism’ and growing inequalities 
in incomes and wealth. Thus successful entrepreneurship in developing countries ‘has 
led to serious economic distortions… [developing countries] have taken factor-market 
imperfections and transmuted them into product market imperfections’ (ibid.: 55).  
 
Second, he noted that by the end of the 1970s at least, that ‘widespread success has not 
been achieved in technological entrepreneurship’ (ibid.: 53). While this remain true for 
many developing countries even today (especially for many in Africa), important 
examples of successful technological entrepreneurship in developing countries exist. 
The foremost examples are Brazil, China, and India. In each of these technological 
innovation is playing an increasingly important role in growth. Thus Brazil is a global 
pioneer in bio-fuel technology; China is a growing developer and exporter of high-tech 
goods,19 and India is world famous for the rapid emergence of its software sector (and 
                                                 
19 Puga and Trefler (2008) notes that by 2000-02 about 48 per cent of all innovative new goods imported 
by the USA came from China.  26 
one should not forget its innovative pharmaceutical sector). What all three of these 
countries have in common though, is a very low score and rank on the World Bank’s 
index for the ease of doing business. Thus Brazil is ranked 122nd, China 83rd, and India 
120th, out of 178 countries in 2008. In fact as Table 7 shows, a number of developing 
countries have performed well in terms of producing and exporting technologically 
innovative goods despite having low rankings on the ease of doing business indicators. 
Table 7: Change in the percentage of new goods imported by the USA and exporting 
countries’ ranking in terms of ease of doing business 
  Change in the number 
of new goods imported, 
2000-02 (%) 
Change in the value of 
new goods imported, 
2000-02 (%) 
Country ranking on 
the ease of doing 
business in 2008 
Advanced economies      
Japan -13  -24  12 
Canada 0  -18  7 
Germany -1  -4  20 
Developing economies      
China 30  5  83 
Malaysia 8  5  24 
Thailand 6  0  15 
India 5  0  120 
Mexico 4  -2  44 
Philippines 4  3  133 
Indonesia 2  0  123 
Source: Adapted from Puga and Trefler (2008: 4). 
 
There are a growing number of developing countries, not only with high opportunity 
entrepreneurship, but also with apparently growing technological entrepreneurship, with 
low rankings on the ease of doing business index. Athreye (2008) investigates the 
reason why India’s software industry developed so rapidly despite the country’s low 
ranking. As she put it ‘In theory, the Indian software industry should not have 
developed the way it did … the software industry achieved its astonishing results 
despite the adverse conditions facing entrepreneurs’ (ibid.: 2). 
 
Mani (2008) documents the reasons for the success of technology entrepreneurship in 
India, despite the country’s low ranking on the ease of doing business index. The main 
reason lies in proactive government support policy. Thus, the Indian government did not 
assume that the supply of entrepreneurship will be automatically forthcoming to exploit 
the opportunities that existed globally. One of the most salient proactive measures 
discussed by Mani (ibid.) is the extension of financial support schemes such as venture 
capital funds20 to entrepreneurs. 
 
The significant growth of entrepreneurship in China since the country’s economic 
reforms started in 1978 has also benefitted from proactive government 
                                                 
20 According to Mani (2008: 2) ‘Although the absolute level of venture capital investments in India is 
low, it has been growing at a rate of 90 per cent over the last few years and at this rate of growth, the 
industry is set to match Europe by 2009 or 2010’.  27 
targeting/support. Thus, as Table 7 shows, the number new products exported from 
China to the USA between 2000 and 2002 increased by over 30 per cent. Rates of 
opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship in China are high: between 2003 and 2007 the 
average annual rate of opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship in China was 8.2 per 
cent. These achievements are despite the fact that China is ranked only 83
rd in terms of 
the ease of doing business. What is driving these opportunity entrepreneurs? Since 1978 
a number of proactive policy measures were introduced to support private sector 
development. A full discussion falls outside the scope of the present, although it can be 
noted that these include the transformation and privatisation of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), learning from foreign firms through encouraging the inflow of FDI, the explicit 
encouragement of high-tech entrepreneurship (Rui and Yip 2008: 217) and huge 
investments in infrastructure, particularly trade and transport-related infrastructure21 
(Dollar 2008).  
 
The cases of India and China are illuminating, but by no means unique where 
entrepreneurship and economic growth has flourished. Countries which are seen as 
‘entrepreneurial’ today, historically had important proactive state support for private 
sector development.22 Lazonick (2008) argues that the examples of the world’s 
advanced ‘entrepreneurial’ economies all point to the importance of a ‘developmental 
state’ for entrepreneurship. I will conclude in this regard by quoting Lazonick:  
 
While entrepreneurship epitomizes the opportunities for the reallocation 
of a society’s productive resources that open markets offer, they do so 
within national contexts in which the state invariably plays a 
fundamental developmental role. My argument, based on comparative-
historical research, is that in all the advanced economies over the past 
century, first and foremost the United States where the ideology of ‘free 
market’ entrepreneurialism is most virulent, successful entrepreneurship 
in knowledge intensive industries has depended heavily upon a 
combination of (a) business allocation of resources to innovative 
investment strategies, and (b) government investment in the knowledge 
base, state sponsored protection of markets and intellectual property 
rights, and (often extensive and persistent) state subsidies to support 
these business strategies. (2008: 1-2) 
 
7 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper I have argued that not all types of entrepreneurship are good for economic 
growth. From a survey of the literature I concluded that the evidence on the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and economic growth, and between governance indicators 
and the ease of doing business and entrepreneurship is ambiguous, and contains a 
number of methodological weaknesses. Therefore, I used GEM data on opportunity and 
necessity entrepreneurship from 60 countries covering the period 2003-07 to test two 
                                                 
21 According to Dollar (2008: 10) ‘The combination of low tariffs, efficient customs, and efficient ports 
means that large numbers of firms in China are very well connected to the international market’.  
22 Importantly, as Minniti (2008a) also stress, is that where successful in these countries, and also in the 
cases of India and China, tailoring of support measures to local (subnational) circumstances has been 
noticeable. 28 
hypotheses, namely that (i) it is opportunity rather than necessity entrepreneurship that 
matters for economic growth, and that (ii) governance and the ease of doing business 
(start-up costs) will not have a direct effect on opportunity entrepreneurship.  
 
Statistical evidence was found to confirm both hypotheses. In particular, I found that 
opportunity entrepreneurship is a significant determinant of economic growth, even 
when one controls for initial GDP per capita, population growth, and fixed capital. It 
also remains significant when various governance indicators are included. With the 
exception of voice and accountability, changes in all of the other governance indicators 
were found to have a positive and significant impact on real GDP growth. As far as the 
relationship between governance and start-up costs and early-stage entrepreneurship is 
concerned, I found that neither start-up costs, nor governance has any statistically 
significant impact on either opportunity or necessity entrepreneurship. Moreover, 
lagged GDP growth did not affect entrepreneurship. Amongst the control variables, 
GDP per capita was found, as in other studies, to be negatively related to both 
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship, and in the case of opportunity 
entrepreneurship, credit extended to the private sector was also found to be a 
statistically significant determinant.  
 
The policy implication which emerges from these results is that the advocacy of better 
governance and an easier environment for doing business may not be sufficient for 
encouraging the type of entrepreneurship (opportunity-based) which has been found to 
be causing higher economic growth. It may even not be necessary: despite poor 
governance and high start-up costs, opportunity entrepreneurship is high in many 
countries, indicating that entrepreneurs may overcome obstacles.  However this does not 
mean that government support for entrepreneurship has no place, indeed I have pointed 
out that an approach towards entrepreneurship based only on improving governance and 
lowering start-up costs are reactive. More proactive measures, such as support for 
venture finance,23 education and training, particularly for technology entrepreneurship, 
was argued to be appropriate for developing countries. The cases of India, China, but as 
well the experiences of many of the world’s current advanced entrepreneurial 
economies stand out as examples in this regard. 
 
Finally, an important finding from the view of entrepreneurship policy found in this 
paper is that there is a significant and positive impact of changes in governance on 
economic growth in the sample. One reason why this might happen is that better 
governance reduce destructive entrepreneurship (including rent-seeking) even though it 
does not raise opportunity entrepreneurship. Thus opportunity entrepreneurship and 
destructive entrepreneurship may be poor substitutes—the requirements for being a 
good opportunity-motivated entrepreneur may differ too substantially from the 
requirements from being good at rent-seeking). Because of a lack of quantification of 
‘destructive’ entrepreneurship, I could not directly test these conclusions, and they must 
remain tentative until future research could provide more clarity.24 Through better 
governance and proactive measures private sector development can be encouraged in 
                                                 
23 Financial development was found to be a significant determinant of opportunity-motivated 
entrepreneurship. 
24 Future research could also clarify the causality between opportunity entrepreneurship and reforms in 
governance. It has been argued that entrepreneurs may improve the institutional framework in a country 
(see e.g. Douhan and Henrekson 2008; Li et al. 2006).  29 
ways which both supports productive entrepreneurship and limits destructive 
entrepreneurship. 
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